[b]Московские переговоры 1939 года [/b]между СССР , Великобританией и Францией о заключении договора о взаимопомощи, проходили в апреле — авг...
18:00 17.05.2013
Тилимине ! Читай тут
Объективные предпосылки к тому, чтобы наступление на англо-французских союзников стало для вермахта «триумфальным маршем», были созданы в Москве в августе—сентябре 1939 г.
23 ноября 1939 г., вдохновляя своих генералов перед большим наступлением на Западном фронте, Гитлер имел все основания заявить, что «произошло то, чего мы желали с 1870г. и фактически считали невозможным. Впервые в истории нам приходится воевать только на одном фронте, никакой другой фронт нас сейчас не сковывает...» «Другой фронт» (т.е. Советский Союз) казался Гитлеру — и оказался на самом деле — настолько безопасным, что германское командование смогло сосредоточить для вторжения во Францию практически все наличные силы, в том числе — почти всю авиацию. Из округов ПВО Кенигсберга (Калининграда), Бреслау (Вроцлава), Дрездена, Нюрнберга, Вены были сняты все истребители до одного. В зоне ПВО Берлина был оставлен штаб 3-й истребительной эскадрильи и одна из ее истребительных групп (II/JG-3), всего 49 самолетов, из них 39 исправных по состоянию на 10 мая 1940 г. Более того, когда на 15-й день наступления у немцев возникли проблемы с бензином, товарищ Молотов утешил немецкого посла в Москве графа Шуленбурга тем, что «вопрос о желаемом количестве нефтепродуктов не вызывает возражений с советской стороны... все предложения германского правительства приняты. Дано полное согласие. При теперешних операциях действительно нужны и автобензин, и газойль для немецкой армии, действия которой замечательно успешные...» (69, стр. 287).
В таких условиях немцам удалось 10 мая 1940 г. создать на Западном фронте самую большую группировку сил люфтваффе за все время Второй мировой войны. Армии вторжения должны были поддерживать 2-й воздушный флот (командующий Кессельринг) и 3-й воздушный флот (командующий Шперле). В полосе фронта наступления в 250— 300 км было сосредоточено 27 истребительных и 40 бомбардировочных авиагрупп (полков), 9 групп пикировщиков Ju-87 и 9 групп многоцелевых двухмоторных Me-110. Всего 3641 боевой самолет (и это без учета устаревших бипланов «Арадо» Аг-68 и «Хеншель» Hs-123, без учета транспортной, санитарной, разведывательной авиации). Из 27 истребительных групп 26 были полностью перевооружены на «Мессершмитты» новейшей на тот момент модификации Е.
21:59 18.05.2013
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Для zaperdenos:
Цитата: "Вы будете читать предидущее или нет? Еще раз для тупых. Перевод на русский язык,текста этих полномочий за подписью Молтова.Где?Хранится в секретном архиве НАШЕГО МИДа. "
Для особо тупых: мне перевод без надобности, я и на английском разберусь. ГДЕ ТЕКСТ ?
а вот теперь для zaperenos: Слушай, чудак на буква "М", неужели ты всерьез думаешь, что я Солонина не читал, причем в бумажном варианте? И неужели ты думаешь, что его писульки по военной истории (в которой он разбирается хуже, чем свинья в апельсинах) хоть чего-то стОят?
По образованию Солонин - авиаинженер, и про самолеты он написал толково (во всяком случае, я прочитал с интересом). Но когда он начал писать о сухопутных войсках - у меня уши в трубочку начали сворачиваться. Кроме того, источники своих "цифирек" он почему-то держит в секрете. Что наводит на некоторые мысли.....
23:02 18.05.2013
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Telemine писал(а) в ответ на :
>Слушай, чудак на буква "М",
Слушай "М" мне надоел твой тон.Не пошел бы ты на №"1? Какой -то дибилизм,Ведь элементарные вещи.21 августа 1939 года.Ну, почему нельзя сразу было заключить союз с англичанами,ведь все равно его потом заключили?Сразу. 27 млн. погибщих из которых 16 млн. здоровых мужчин репродуктивного возраста,ведь это национальный Холокост. Уроды.Все правильно все правильно,иначе поступать было нельзя.Натуральные папуасы.Ничему не научились и никаких выводов не сделали.
23:35 18.05.2013
Цитата: "Слушай "М" мне надоел твой тон.Не пошел бы ты на №"1?"
Договорились, zaperenos, больше ко мне не обращайтесь, и я вам ничего объяснять не стану.
Право комментировать ваши глупости оставляю за собой.
00:55 19.05.2013
zaperenos писал(а) в ответ на :
> ,Ведь элементарные вещи.21 августа 1939 года.Ну, почему нельзя сразу было заключить союз с англичанами,ведь все равно его потом заключили?Сразу. > 27 млн. погибщих из которых 16 млн. здоровых мужчин репродуктивного возраста,ведь это национальный Холокост. Уроды.Все правильно все правильно,иначе поступать было нельзя.Натуральные папуасы.Ничему не научились и никаких выводов не сделали
Что бы дал этот союз? Англия имела обязательства перед Польшей обещая ей неприкосновенность, но это не спасло Польшу. Не спас союз с Британией и Францию которую немцы захватили в максимально короткие сроки. Английский генерал А. Брук, просто бежал из Франции эвакуировав английские войска. Сама Англия в битве против одного экспедиционного немецкого корпуса Э. Роммеля потеряла практически все колонии в Африке. Из Югославии немцы выбили англичан за две недели. Только перенос Гитлером основного удара на восток по СССР спасло Англию от полного разгрома. И только полный провал Англии по всему театру военных действий заставил её 12 июля 1941 года подписать в Москве советско-британское соглашение о совместных действиях против Германии.
01:18 19.05.2013
Завершая тему: и вообще - "ПОСЛЕДНИЙ ШАНС НE ПРАЗДНОВАТЬ 9 МАЯ" (строго в рамках темы) был упущен Гитлером 22 июня 1941 года!
15:39 19.05.2013
zaperenos писал(а) в ответ на :
> Какой -то дибилизм,Ведь элементарные вещи.21 августа 1939 года.Ну, почему нельзя сразу было заключить союз с англичанами,ведь все равно его потом заключили?Сразу.
Потому, что англичане не наделили своего представителя полномочиями подписывать такие договора и активно препятствовали такому союзу.
13:52 30.06.2013
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zaperenos писал(а) в ответ на :
> наивный олбанец писал(а) в ответ на сообщение: >
>> Эльфы, поддерживаю предложение Telemine.
> > Телемине,нейтральный,албанец!!Я уже писал в самом начале,что и эти Полномочия,и множество иных документов начала ВОВ, путинцы закрыли в архивах и никому не показывают.Вот вы все и объединитесь(вместе с этим оооойнанистом),напишите письмо в Кремль,где и попросите их показать.Я не могу.Картинки в инете НЕТ.
Эт почемуй то «ооооооойнанист»? А ты, и такие как ты на что…? Ты обалдуй за меня не переживай… У меня на всех Вас сил хватит и на тебя тоже… Так что некуль тут сцены ревности устраивать… Здесь все-таки люди посторонние… Щасссссс с тылу к тебе подкрадусь… Спою- «Вставай проклятьем заклейменный…» И полчаса качественного «исторического виртуального чихпыха » твоим дурным прелестям в этой теме я тебе гарантирую…»
Я начинаю… расслабься… Юзер ты мой грешный, опять попутался ты как глист в заднице неразборчивого гурмана… И бесовская триколорная нечисть в твоей пустой голове кипит как подгоревшая сечка в солдатском котле…
ОБАЛДУЙ!!! 1. Толька Одна из сторон переговоров не имела на момент их начала полномочий- БРИТАНСКАЯ! 2. В течении 10 дней (СУДЯ ПО ТВОИМ ЖЕ ПРИВЕДЕННЫМ «ИШТОЧНИКАМ»), Правительство СССР, в лице своей делегации на этих переговорах, исходя из интересов СОХРАНЕНИЯ мира в Европе (!!!) вела переговоры с лицом неуполномоченным на это своим правительством, а именно с Адмиралом Драксом, только потому, что данные действия Британской делегации, направленные на срыв переговоров, могли угрожать полномасштабной общеевропейской войной. И судя, по твоему же «источнику» даже 21(!!!) августа не был представлен оригинал этих полномочий, а была зачитана только их копия! То есть, даже 21(!!!) августа Британская делегация не смогла предъявить свои полномочия, которые являются неотъемлемой частью любого договора. 3. На момент начала этих переговоров две стороны, а именно Великобритания и Франция имели договора с нацистами, подписанные на самом высоком уровне…
А теперь вопросы к тебе: Почему Дракс приехал на переговоры без этих полномочий? Почему из трех сторон этих переговоров лишь одна сторона их, то есть полномочия, на момент начала этих переговоров, не имела? Ты мне ответь обалдуй: Что, Дракс не знал куда и зачем ехал? ЕЩЕ РАЗ- ПОЧЕМУ ДРАКС ПРИЕХАЛ!!! ИМЕННО ПРИЕХАЛ НА ПЕРЕГОВОРЫ БЕЗ ПОЛНОМОЧИЙ? Я же тебе объяснял уже дубина стоеросовая, если я еду например в Барселону, на бульвар Рамбла приколоться вечером, то мне не нужны письменные полномочия от г-на Путина на разврат и рас…издяйство… А вот если я еду туда заключать какой-либо договор (не на бульвар…), то без этих полномочий со мной разговаривать никто не будет…
Так шо облажался ты опять обалдуй!
Даааааааааа, дурень… Все-таки ответь мне на вопрос- НУ ПОЧЕМУ АНГЛИЯ И ФРАНЦИЯ ОБЪЯВИЛИ ВОЙНУ ГЕРМАНИИ ЗА НАПАДЕНИЕ НА ПОЛЬШУ, А СССР НЕ ОБЪЯВИЛИ? ЧТО, НАПАДЕНИЯ НЕ БЫЛО, ИЛИ ПЕРЕСРАЛИ ТВОИ ЛЮБИМЫЕ ФРАНЦУЗЫ С АНГЛИЧАНАМИ? Расскажи мне об этом… Я даже волшебное слово произнесу- пожалуйста!
Нет, я понимаю, что этот вопрос для таких как ты, как пожарный брандспойт в триколорных портках… Но отвечать то надо… Надо дурень… Ты ответь, и тебе сразу полегчает… юзер ты мой грешный… Помолись… перекрестись по сетевому… И отвечай…
17:01 30.06.2013
Ойй писал(а) в ответ на :
>Надо дурень
Ты урод, факт что он их предъявил 21 августа ОЧЕВИДЕН,и только такие одно- извиличники как ты это отрицают.А что было до этого -- демократическая билаберда и роли не играет.Раз твой Иоська так мира хочет ,мог бы и подождать 10 дней.Всегда перед подписанием надо совещаться.
20:02 11.07.2013
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zaperenos писал(а) в ответ на :
> Ойй писал(а) в ответ на сообщение: >
>> Надо дурень
> > Ты урод, факт что он их предъявил 21 августа ОЧЕВИДЕН,и только такие одно- извиличники как ты это отрицают.А что было до этого -- демократическая билаберда и роли не играет.
Обалдуй, ты хотя бы понятие о договорном праве имеешь? Я уж не говорю о международном договорном праве? Я вот думаю, что вряд ли… Иначе бы ты мне не втирал сейчас эту хрень! Полномочия, как и доверенность, являются неотъемлемыми частями договоров, при заключении их лицами, действующими на основании этих полномочий. В договор прилагается подлинник доверенности или полномочий!!! Ты понимаешь это идиот!!! Подлинник полномочий или доверенности, при заключении договоров не прилагается только в том случае, когда лицо его подписавшее имеет право действовать без этих полномочий… Это первые лица! В международном праве- главы государств… А тут, даже со слов твоих «ишточников» от 21.08.1939 года: zaperenos писал(а) в ответ на :
> Как вы задолбали своей тупостью читайте здесь были полномочия
А вот цитата оттуда: «Должен Вас информировать, что полномочия Британской миссии получены и будут сейчас оглашены. (Оглашается текст полномочий на английском языке. Перевод на русский язык будет представлен по получении подлинного текста.)». Это написано там, где ты предлагаешь читать всем
Ну…!!! Тело ты мое триколорное… Хде оригинал полномочий на 21 августа 1939 года? В ЛондОне? Или на ямской версте? Нуууу!!! И кто тут урод?
21:04 30.10.2013
Некоторые абзацы из выступлений в британском парламенте.
******************************* Lords Sitting of 3 August 1939 *******************************
LORD SNELL ... In regard to the Polish loan, I understand some accommodation is being arranged, and I should like to ask if any explanation can be given. In regard to Russia, the situation appears to be continuously disappointing. I am not going to assume that Britain is alone responsible for the delay. I have not the facts and I have no right to make assertions, but I cannot help noticing the speed with which the formula at Tokyo was arranged and contrasting it with the exasperating delays that have taken place at Moscow in regard to this arrangement. There may be many reasons to justify what is being done, but Parliament at present does not know what they are. I would like, too, to ask in regard to the position at Danzig whether the noble Viscount will give us any information that he feels it right to divulge. My remarks to-day have been rather in the nature of an interrogation than of a criticism, and I conclude by reminding the House that British citizens, rich and poor, are being asked to make very great sacrifices for the nation`s good. They have submitted with a grim courage to the invasion of their traditional liberties. They have proved in a hundred ways that they are ready to support the Government in any rightful stand that they may take against aggression. Party controversies have, in great part, been suspended. It seems to me, therefore, due to the nation that, as far as possible, it should be sustained by such information as the Government can rightfully supply. I beg to move.
LORD DAVIES ... We have already discussed three subjects. First, I should like to say a few words in regard to the negotiations with the Russian Government. I trust the Foreign Secretary will be able to give us some further information upon this matter. As your Lordships will remember, these negotiations commenced on March 18, when the Foreign Office inquired whether the Government of Russia would support Rumania in the event of an attack. Since that date, over a period of four months, these negotiations have dragged on interminably, causing a great deal of anxiety and also, I am afraid, in some quarters a considerable amount of suspicion as to the real intentions of His Majesty`s Government. The noble Lord who moved the Motion deplored these unfortunate delays, which in one instance amounted to more than three weeks and in another to thirteen or fourteen days. They have been due, I fear, to no procrastination on the part of the Soviet Government, but to the dilatory tactics of our Foreign Office. At a time of extreme emergency it is difficult to understand why there should have been all these delays. In these days of rapid communication it is really impossible to comprehend why so much time should have been needed to frame our replies on the points submitted by the representatives of the U.S.S.R., although we have to remember that on each occasion our Government had to consult with the authorities in France. That, of course, made some difference. Another point I should like to make is this, that it is surely of the utmost importance, when the issues at stake are so vital, that these proceedings should be conducted not in an atmosphere of haggling, but in one of cordiality and friendship. After all that has happened, it is surely essential to create a feeling of mutual confidence, otherwise no pact or bargain, however carefully drafted, is likely to produce the results we all desire. In consequence of that I would suggest once more to the noble Viscount opposite, as I did some time ago, that he or some other prominent member of the Cabinet should undertake a visit to Moscow at the earliest opportunity so as to establish personal contacts with the responsible Ministers there. After all, the noble Viscount went to Berlin and to Rome in pursuit of the policy of appeasement. Why, therefore, may I ask him, with all respect, should he not display at least an equal solicitude for his new policy of building up a Peace Front in order to resist aggression? May I also remind him that in 1917 Lord Milner, who was a member of the Cabinet, accompanied a Military Mission to Russia? I should like if I may to congratulate the Government upon their decision to despatch a Military Mission now. All I venture to plead for is that the noble Viscount, or one of his colleagues, should accompany it in order that further delays may be avoided and the protracted negotiations may be brought to a successful issue. There is one other question I should like to ask before leaving this subject. We have now, apparently, agreed on all the points in the Russian proposals except the definition of what constitutes indirect aggression. I wonder if the Foreign Secretary can tell us whether there is a clause in the Polish Pact which deals with this question of indirect aggression, and if so, is there any reason why a similar clause should not be inserted in the proposed pact with Russia? ... If we have any regard for treaty obligations, the Nine-Power Treaty for instance, or for our signature of the Covenant, or for the reputation of the British. Empire in the Far East, or even for our commercial and trading interests in China, surely it is imperative to make up our minds to support the Chinese Government. I ask your Lordships how can we expect to be successful in our negotiations with Russia, or to inspire the confidence of General Chiang Kai-Shek if we condone the brutal campaign which Japan has been carrying on in China, and if we are prepared also to carry on negotiations with the aggressor which are bound, sooner or later, to bring us into antagonism with the Chinese Government? Clearly I think we shall inevitably run the risk of falling between two stools. If we regard it from the standpoint of British interests alone is it not better, is it not more statesmanlike, to assist China in her battle for freedom than to capitulate to Japan? If Japan wins this war she will treat this vast country and its teeming population as a Japanese preserve from which all European trade and commerce will undoubtedly be excluded. ...
VISCOUNT SAMUEL ... Although an agreement with Russia has not yet been completed neither on the other hand have negotiations broken down, and there is every reason to hope that they will be carried to a successful conclusion. I think there would have been less disappointment with regard to the slow progress of the negotiations with the Soviet if on two or three occasions at an earlier stage there had not been evidently inspired declarations from the Government that a pact was on the point of signature. That proved on each occasion to be a premature hope. It is a sound axiom never to prophesy unless you know, and it was certainly an error for the Government to allow the impression to go abroad that an agreement with Russia was immediately at hand. However, now military action is being concerted, and perhaps that is of even greater importance than the signature of a detailed pact. If the noble Viscount the Foreign Secretary is able to make any statement—I do not know whether he can or whether it may be inconvenient to do so—if he can with advantage make a statement on the course of negotiations, I am sure the information would be very gratefully received. ...
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE ... When I read—and I am glad to say did not hear to-day—attacks on the Government because negotiations with Russia are going so slowly I must say I think that is most unfair. If we get an agreement with Russia within the next year or two that will be rapid. The Russians are extremely acute diplomatists. You have to get up very early to deal with them, and that is not our habit.
LORD STRABOLGI You did not take long to get an agreement with them.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE I had not only to get up early but I had to refuse to go to bed while I was negotiating the Russian Treaty of 1924. This quest for a formula which is going on both in the Far East and in Moscow is a most difficult business. I remember very well on one occasion being kept up all night with an objection to certain words that had been put in a certain clause. Two or three nights afterwards one of my colleagues discovered the word "notwithstanding," and we sailed on after that for several weeks. We are not very good at finding formulas. We are not very good at negotiation, and it is because of that that I have deplored all along the entanglements that we have let ourselves in for. I have been frightened lest some minor incident, some outbreak on a frontier, might lead us into the carrying out of certain obligations which necessitate force. I do not know if the noble Viscount, the Foreign Secretary, can say anything with regard to the frontier incident between Hungary and Rumania. We are bound to defend Rumania, but it is not necessary that Rumania should be in the right in a controversy with Hungary. That is the sort of entanglement in which it is inadvisable that we should be caught up, in what I have referred to as this diplomatic contest which is going on in so many parts of the world. ... Now I must just say something about Russia. His Majesty`s Government have, I suppose, taken the lead in endeavouring to organise a combination of resistance against aggression, and the fact that the principal portion of blame for every difficulty or delay falls on them shows indeed that their leading role is generally acknowledged. If the world were just, His Majesty`s Government would receive, of course, the lion`s share of credit for whatever has been achieved, but as the world, or the people in it, is or are not always just, His Majesty`s Government make no complaint at all of shouldering the greater part of the blame for real or imaginary failures. The basis of British policy has been, as your Lordships are aware, close co-operation with France in defence of interests that are common, as was explicitly laid down in the declaration made so long ago as the beginning of February by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place. It was starting from that point that His Majesty`s Government offered their guarantee to Poland and Rumania, and undoubtedly by doing that they made a substantial contribution to the security of Russia and it was in view of the fact that they felt obliged at that time to act promptly, with, I think I can say, the approval of the overwhelming mass of opinion in this country—not in the presence of Lord Ponsonby clearly unanimous, but I think the overwhelming mass of opinion—that they did not make their action dependent on receiving any counterpart then and there from the Soviet Government. The present negotiations with Russia have, as we all know, as their object the strengthening of the forces against possible aggression, and noble Lords will no doubt realise that to provide an instrument which will cover every possible contingency is a very complicated task which must inevitably give rise to certain divergencies of view. Moreover, as we also know very well, the problem is further complicated by the necessity of trying to provide for the new technique of indirect aggression. His Majesty`s Government and the French Government and the Soviet Government are in full agreement on the necessity of trying to make such provision, but the differences which have arisen relate to the precise form in which this elusive shadow of indirect aggression can be brought to definition. Our common object is to find a formula which may cover what may rightly be regarded as indirect aggression without in any way encroaching on the independence and the neutrality of other States, and it is no secret that the proposals that the British and French Governments have made have appeared to the Soviet Government insufficiently comprehensive, whilst the formula favoured by the Soviet Government has seemed to His Majesty`s Government and the French Government to go too far in the other direction. The delays—and I confess, although I am naturally restrained in judgment, I am not so pessimistic as Lord Ponsonby who talks in terms of years—which have occurred have not only risen from the complexity of the problem in hand which affects the rights and interests of a very large number of States. I rather doubt whether even noble Lords, and I am quite sure still more of the general public outside, fully realise all that is involved in negotiations of this character. It is quite true that an interim agreement such as those made with Poland and with Turkey can be concluded relatively quickly; in the case of both these countries, the formal agreements are still under discussion. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked me whether our agreement with Poland included a definition of indirect aggression and, if it did, why it was not possible to transplant that definition into the Russian Agreement. Well, the answer is that the formal agreement with Poland is still being agreed, it is still not concluded, and the arrangement on which we have been working and are working with Poland does not, I think, refer to indirect aggression in the form that he has in his mind, and for the simple reason that will be at once apparent to the noble Lord if he casts his mind back, that our guarantee to Poland rested upon a perfectly simple, precise, but rather different basis. Our guarantee to Poland, he will remember, was made operative in the event of Polish independence being clearly threatened and the Polish Government feeling it necessary to resist and so on. However, that is rather by way of parenthesis. The Soviet Government, in contradistinction from what we were able to do with Turkey and Poland, preferred to proceed without any intermediate stage to the conclusion of a formal agreement, and the terms of that formal agreement naturally have required careful consideration. It was inevitable that there was a great deal of discussion to be done on the drafting and so on. I was very glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Davies, acknowledge, as he very fairly did, that the fact that we had to agree any modifications and alterations with the French Government necessarily and inevitably involved a certain measure of additional time expenditure. It has been assumed in some quarters, and I rather think that Lord Davies assumed it to-day—attributing, indeed, I think, to me a certain role that seemed to him appropriate—that had His Majesty`s Government been represented by a Cabinet Minister instead of an Ambassador a quick agreement would have been secured. Well, I do not really know what warrant he can certainly feel to have for any such surmise, and I do not think experience supports him. He will remember, as I remember, the Washington Naval Conference, for example, in 1921, when His Majesty`s Government was represented by a most distinguished Minister, the late Lord Balfour. Although the ground for that Conference had been prepared with the utmost diligence through diplomatic channels it took no less than three months there to secure agreement. In the present case I understand M. Molotov is obliged at every stage to consult his Government, and the same would have applied to any British representative, whether in the Cabinet or out of the Cabinet, who had been on our behalf conducting the negotiations for His Majesty`s Government in Moscow.
LORD DAVIES I apologise for interrupting the noble Viscount, but may I point out that at Washington several nations were represented by delegations, whilst the present discussions in Moscow are bilateral, only two countries being involved?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX Yes I appreciate the noble Lord`s point, but he perhaps will not overlook the fact that if you have the interests of several nations to consider, it may be easier if you have in one place the representatives of all these nations, than if the representatives of two or three nations have to consider the interests of many countries not represented, which has been our case in these negotiations. Leaving that aside, the fact that His Majesty`s Government and the French Government have decided to despatch Military Missions to Moscow—I think they leave, if I am rightly informed, the day after to-morrow—before full agreement has been reached on the political issues may be held, I hope, to be the best evidence of the bona fides and determination of His Majesty`s Government, and concrete evidence not only of our interest to bring these negotiations to an early and successful conclusion but of our belief that that step will facilitate outstanding discussions on political issues which will proceed simultaneously with the military discussions. I had on my notes something to say in regard to the Turkish negotiations, but I do not think that I need detain your Lordships beyond saying, as your Lordships would indeed anticipate, that they are, I think, proceeding satisfactorily and smoothly and that the understanding between our two Governments is very cordial and complete. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me if I had anything to say about the frontier incident reported in the Press yesterday between Hungary and Rumania. I have not had any direct official information in regard to it, but I had the opportunity this morning of seeing the Rumanian Minister, who told me that he hoped and thought that no particular significance was to be attached to it, especially having regard to the fact that the Hungarian Government had themselves immediately suggested that it should be referred to a Joint Commission of Inquiry representing these two countries. Now I must just say a word or two in regard to another subject on which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the noble Viscount, Lord Samuel, and I think others have asked me a question. That is Danzig. But I do not know, with your Lordships` permission, that I want to say very much. Your Lordships will recollect that the Prime Minister in another place on July 10 last set out the attitude of His Majesty`s Government in a statement which, in some quarters there may be surprise to learn, I had some hand in drafting. I do not want to quote parts of that statement because it was a balanced whole, and still less would I wish to quote it all to your Lordships, but I would only say this in regard to it. Its terms were I think clear, they were precise, and they were certainly carefully weighed, and I do not wish to say to-day anything in any way to weaken whatever may be held to be their effect or their value. But I would say one word in reply to a particular point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. He spoke about the possibilities of an international force in Danzig. Those of us who are familiar with the contributions that the noble Lord from time to time makes in your Lordships` House were not surprised to find that he had adjusted his remedy of universal application to that which is for the moment of particular interest in all our minds. The fact that I do not think, as I do not think, that the installation of an international force in Danzig at this moment would be a practical and useful step in all the circumstances, does not mean that His Majesty`s Government are not watching the situation most closely or that they are not fully alive to the possible repercussions or developments in that quarter upon the future of European peace. May I say before I leave that part of the world a few words in regard to Poland and more particularly the Anglo-Polish financial negotiations to which reference has been made? As your Lordships know, discussions with the Polish delegation have covered two separate matters. The first relates to export credits, and I am glad to say, as your Lordships may have noticed in the Press, that an agreement was signed yesterday for the guarantee of export credits to Poland up to an amount of rather over £8,000,000 in order to facilitate the purchase in this country by the Polish Government of material necessary for their defence. Discussions have also been taking place on the possibility of a cash loan to Poland by His Majesty`s Government and the French Government acting jointly, and along with all members of your Lordships` House I greatly regret that it was not found possible to reach agreement as to the conditions on which such a loan might be made available in time for Parliament to be asked to pass the necessary legislation before we rise. The difficulties that were in the way were, as has been stated in another place, technical difficulties, and it would not I think be in the public interest to discuss them, but I may add just this, that the difficulties that arose were not difficulties in connection with the purchase of arms by Poland in countries other than the United Kingdom. There has been some misconception on that point, and I think it is worth making that plain. I would also add that these difficulties have in no degree—I think I can safely say this—impaired the relations of complete confidence that exist between the Governments of the two countries. ...
********************************* Commons Sitting of 4 August 1939 ********************************
Mr. Vyvyan Adams asked the Prime Minister, whether he has any statement to make on the progress of negotiations between Moscow and London.
The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Butler) I have nothing to add to the statement which the Prime Minister made on 31st July.
Mr. Adams In order to complete the military side of these negotiations, will the Government of the United Kingdom now send to Moscow a Minister Plenipotentiary?
Mr. Butler I am afraid I can add nothing to the statements which the Prime Minister has already made on this and other aspects of this matter.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn Are we to take it from the remark made by the Prime Minister on Wednesday last, during the Debate on the Adjournment of the House, that he has very little hope of these negotiations being successful within the next month?
Mr. Mander (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he can state the formulas put forward by the Russian Government on the one side and the British Government on the other to cover the case of indirect aggression?
The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain) No, Sir. It is not customary to publish documents of this character without the assent of other parties to the negotiations.
Mr. Mander In view of the controversy and uncertainty which exist in this country on this matter, does not the Prime Minister think that it would be in the public interest that the relative positions taken up by the two countries should be clearly stated, and will he be good enough —.
Mr. Speaker The hon. Member has had a very decided answer to his Question.
Mr. Mander But may I ask —.[HON. MEMBERS: "Order."] I think there is a point which you will admit, Mr. Speaker —.[Hon. Members: "Order."] On a point of Order. The question I want to put to the Prime Minister —.I am not putting it now —.is this: He says that it is not desirable to make any statement without consulting another Government, and my point is whether he will be good enough to consider the possibility of consulting with the Russian Government about a joint publication. That arises directly out of the reply.
********************************** Commons Sitting of 24 August 1939 **********************************
The Prime Minister ... That was the situation on Tuesday last, when in Berlin and Moscow it was announced that negotiations had been taking place, and were likely soon to be concluded, for a non-aggression pact between those two countries. I do not attempt to conceal from the House that that announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. For some time past there had been rumours about an impending change in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, but no inkling of that change had been conveyed either to us or to the French Government by the Soviet Government. The House may remember that on 31st July I re marked that we had engaged upon steps almost unprecedented in character. I said that we had shown a great amount of trust and a strong desire to bring the negotiations with the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion when we agreed to send our soldiers, sailors and airmen to Russia to discuss military plans together before we had any assurance that we should be able to reach an agreement on political matters. Well, Sir, nevertheless, moved by the observation of the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that if we could come to a successful conclusion of our military discussions, political agreement should not present any insuperable difficulties, we sent the Mission. The British and French Missions reached Moscow on 11th August. They were warmly received, in friendly fashion, and discussions were actually in progress and had proceeded on a basis of mutual trust when this bombshell was flung down. It, to say the least of it, was highly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were proceeding on that basis, the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects of their foreign policy, as we had understood it. I do not propose this afternoon to pass any final judgment upon this incident. That, I think, would be premature until we have had an opportunity of consulting with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of this agreement, the text of which was published only this morning. But the question that the Government had to consider when they learned of this announcement was what effect, if any, this changed situation would have upon their own policy. In Berlin the announcement was hailed, with extraordinary cynicism, as a great diplomatic victory which re moved any danger of war since we and France would no longer be likely to fulfill our obligations to Poland. We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.
The House will recollect that the guarantee which we had given to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was talked of, and that it was not in any way made dependent upon any such agreement being reached. How then could we, with honour, go back upon such an obligation, which we had so often and so plainly repeated? There fore, our first act was to issue a statement that our obligations to Poland and to other countries remained unaffected. Those obligations rest upon agreed statements made to the House of Commons, to which effect is being given in treaties which are at present in an advanced stage of negotiation. Those treaties, when concluded, will formally define our obligations, but they do not in any way alter, they do not add to or subtract from, the obligations of mutual assistance which have already been accepted. The communiqué which we issued to the Press after the meeting of the Cabinet this week spoke also of certain measures of defence which we had adopted. It will be re membered that, as I have said, Germany has an immense army of men already under arms and that military preparations of all kinds have been and are being carried on on a vast scale in that country. ...
Mr. Greenwood ... What is the situation? The peace front which most of us hoped for has been greatly impaired by the news of this morning, but Britain and France remain firmly in alliance and close friendship. They have other friends. We have undertaken obligations with regard to Poland; obligations which the Prime Minister has reminded us were entered into prior to the discussions with the U.S.S.R., and in that sense we are in no worse a position than we should have been had the blow fallen earlier. That may be cold comfort, but at least the fact that we did at that time enter into those obligations without knowing that there was any possibility of help from the U.S.S.R. ought to confirm us in our attitude. ...
Sir Archibald Sinclair ... It is yet too early to assess the precise value and significance, or to predict the duration, of the Russo-German Pact which was signed in Moscow this morning. Its clear implication, however, is that it is to the British Empire rather than to Russia that Herr Hitler will in future look for his territorial living space. If I might venture one further observation upon that Agreement, it would be this. Article 2 reads as follows: " If one of the contracting Powers should become the object of warlike action on the part of a third Power "—" not agression—nor apparently would it make any difference if the warlike action was the result of aggression against a third Power by Germany— " the other contracting Power will in no way support the third Power." The conclusion of such an agreement with the Nazi Government by the Soviet Government at a time when the Soviet Government was strongly demanding the right to move troops through Poland in order to help to resist possible German aggression against that country is almost incomprehensible; but before coming to a final judgment we must, as the Prime Minister has said this afternoon, await the explanation which the Soviet Government will, no doubt, offer in due course to its own people and to the world. ...
Mr. Lansbury ... I know I shall be told that I do not understand Herr Hitler and Colonel Beck and Signor Mussolini. It happens that I know their prototypes in this country. Men and women everywhere are much the same, and statesmen are much the same in all countries. [Hon. Members: "No."] I may be allowed to express that opinion after having met all of them. I have that advantage, that I have seen them all face to face and talked to them, or rather they talked to me face to face. [Laughter.] I notice that that rather jeering cheer means that they did not listen to me. Do not you believe it. I am not the sort of person who is talked down to; I can talk down to people as well as they can to me. The point I am making, and I make it in all seriousness, is that there are two men in Europe who, in my judgment, hold the peace of the world in their hands. One is Joseph Stalin and the other is Herr Hitler. If I were the Prime Minister I should write to Stalin or telegraph to him and tell him that I was going to see him as soon as an aeroplane could get me there. I know that there are people who all the time have thought that it was wrong to have dealings with the Bolshevists. But I happen to have spent five hours with Joseph Stalin and I do not believe, and I shall not believe till the event proves it, that either Stalin or any other member of the Russian Government de sires anything else but peace for Russia and peace for the world. But we are in a situation now in which there is a worse deadlock than any we have had to face before. I want to ask quite definitely that a response be made both to the appeal made by General Smuts and the appeal made by King Leopold, and that we will not just pass all this emergency legislation, but that some other steps, concrete steps, will be taken to bring about a meeting of those most concerned. ...
Mr. Gallacher ... The Prime Minister spoke of Soviet policy "as we understood it." In March of this year, Joseph Stalin made a very important speech. Will any hon. Member tell me how many news papers in this country published that speech or how many hon. Members read it? Joseph Stalin said: " The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit: " `(1) We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country. (2) We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position and we 30 shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or in directly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet State.`" I warn every hon. Member to pay attention to the third point: "We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country." No. 4 says: "We are not afraid of threats of aggression and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet policy." Stalin says: "We are ready to come to the defence of countries whose independence is threatened." Who came to the assistance of China? Who came to the assistance of Spain? Who at the last moment offered to come to the assistance of Czecho-Slovakia? Was it the British Government, or the "fifth column" which is so strongly represented in this House? No, it was Russia. Russia has proved that she is ready to take a stand in defence of those nations whose independence is threatened. Stalin made such a speech on 10th March, and on 15th March we had such a serious event as the invasion of Prague. Why then was it not possible to have obtained immediately after that a pact of mutual assistance between this country and the Soviet Union? It was because the Prime Minister of this country did not want such a pact, and he does not want it now. How was it possible, if there was a serious desire for a pact, that a clerk should be sent across to negotiate, a clerk whose standing and record in Russia were such as not to help negotiations? How was it possible to negotiate a pact in such circumstances? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) said that this was a deliberate insult to a mighty Power. It is of the greatest importance, it is of decisive importance, that we get such a pact. I remember the conditions under which we met last year, when everybody gave the Prime Minister permission to go to Munich. At the time I drew attention to the disastrous consequences that would follow from that, and hon. Members were yelling at me all the time as they have been doing to-day. If this House took its duties seriously it would not agree to part until a decision had been arrived at that a representative delegation with full power should go to Moscow, or until representatives from Moscow were invited to come here. I would like to make an appeal to Members on this side. Nobody can find fault with the manner in which the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition has maintained his connection with the leaders of the Government as the crisis has developed, but, in view of our knowledge of the responsibility of this Government for the tragic situation that has developed, it would have been of the utmost importance if there had been contact with other sections of the Opposition in order to put an end to the Government and to get a Government, such as many hon. Members have spoken about, which would in spire the confidence and trust of the people. If the Opposition leaders had been brought together they are strong enough, and have sufficient force in the country, to ensure the necessary changes in the Government that would produce a situation in which we would have not a fifth column Government, but a Government that was desirous of peace in its very best sense. It is suggested in a telegram I have received that it would be very good if a delegation representing the Labour movement went with an official delegation from the Government in order to bring about the closest fraternal alliance between the working-class movement of this country and the working-class movement of Russia. Just before I came into the House I had a telegram which said: "Make Greenwood fly to Russia. Signed, Holborn Democrats." The idea is good: it means the closest possible association with Russia. We have to face what may become an absolute catastrophe for the people of this country and the people of Europe. We will not hesitate to take our stand at any time against Fascist aggression no matter what the consequences may be. We make no attempt to hide ourselves behind meaningless pacifist phrases. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who is `we`?"] I am talking about the Communists. ...
Mr. Bellenger It may be, as the hon. Member for West Fife (Mr. Gallacher) has said, that the Government have been rather slow in negotiating with Russia, but I do not think that even that is a sufficient reason for Russia altering her whole policy and entering into a pact with Germany. I do not know what is the interpretation which Germany or Russia puts upon the pact, but I shall watch with considerable interest the reactions in Russia if Germany, as I believe she will do very shortly, makes some attempt to get what she wants in Poland by force. I do not rise to make a speech; I merely want to address a question to the Prime Minister, who unfortunately is not here at the moment. Perhaps it will be brought to his notice later on. It is a question which, I think, has some importance in view of recent events in Moscow. We have a British Mission to Moscow. It was sent there in unprecedented circumstances, and some of us have wondered how it was possible for the Government to send it in view of the absence of a political agreement in advance. Nevertheless, the military mission is there. How far it has gone towards exchanging important military information with Russia I do not know, but I am greatly perturbed in my mind, and I think hon. Members in all parts of the House are in the same position. I, therefore, address this question to the Deputy-Leader of the House. Perhaps he may not be able to give an answer now, and I hope the Prime Minister will give an answer through the Press. What is to be the position of our mission in Russia? Even if it is not possible to withdraw the mission forthwith, I hope that a stop will immediately be put to any further discussion of those military, naval or air force plans which, presumably, the mission took out from this country.
Miss Rathbone I think we all want to forgo futile re criminations, but we cannot forgo a form of criticism which reflects upon the future. I listened with a good deal of interest to what was said by the solitary representative of the Communist party. I think we all have to realise that there is some truth in what he said. For once in my life I agree with the Prime Minister when he said it would be a mistake too soon to forecast the exact meaning of the Russian Pact. It was a knock-down blow, though it is two years since I wrote a book in which I prophesied that this very thing would happen, and that, if we continued cold-shouldering and turning our back on Russia and acting independently of her, Russia might do the same, and the very thing that has come about might come about, and we might see a Russo-German Agreement. In considering the situation we cannot absolve the Government from blame for the way in which the Russian negotiations have been conducted. Supposing a year ago the Government had taken as firm a line as it is taking to-day, supposing that we had then entered into full negotiations in defence of Czecho-Slovakia and resolved, with Russia by our side, to withstand the aggressor, should we not be in an infinitely stronger position than we are? Then, again, when the guarantee was given to Poland, why was Russia not consulted first? Why was she not asked whether she would not stand by our side in giving a guarantee? I believe she would have done it at that time. It was the worst way to conduct these negotiations when the Prime Minister himself twice went to see Hitler, and took the Foreign Secretary with him to see Mussolini, but sent neither a Minister nor an Ambassador to Russia. The negotiations were conducted by a mere Councillor and on behalf of Ministers who until a few weeks previously had been completely opposed to an agreement with Russia. I think that was a very bad diplomatic mistake.
Mr. Bevan I do not rise to continue the Debate for any length of time, but I must say that it is a little hard for some of us who for many years, in this House and outside, have been engaged in prophesying this moment to hear one of the chief architects of it say that he wishes to shorten the discussion on the subject that is before the House. It is all very well for hon. Members on that side to applaud the sentiment which the Prime Minister has just uttered, but they must remember that they bear a very large part of the responsibility for this present situation. We have to go back and report to our constituents on the issues which have been discussed to-day. I rise to ask whether the mind of the Government has been closed to the possibility of entering into, not military, but political, discussions with the Government of Russia immediately, for the purpose of discovering the ramifications and the con sequences of the Non-Aggression Pact entered into with Germany, and finding out whether it is not still possible to arrive at an arrangement with Russia which will increase the deterrent to Ger many against committing an act of aggression against Poland. It must be present in the mind of every Member of this House that a guarantee to Poland is very difficult of execution without the assistance of Russia. When the guarantee to Poland was discussed in the House, immediately after it was given, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) pointed out that the military assistance that Britain and France could render to Poland was very little indeed in the absence of an agreement with Russia, and the Prime Minister to-day expressed the view that it was still too early to form a final judgment on the actual nature of the undertaking entered into between Russia and Germany. I, therefore, want to ask whether it is not possible to start political negotiations with Russia immediately, in order to find out the actual position. I believe that, out side this House, people throughout the country will want to know why the negotiations with Russia were so pro longed, why they have broken down, and why it is that Ribbentrop, the Ger man Foreign Secretary, could go to Moscow and no one of equal standing has been sent from Great Britain to Moscow. It is all very well for hon. Members to shout the usual cries in a crisis of this kind, but this will require some justification to the people of this country, who will want to know why millions of young British lads should lose their lives—lives which might have been saved if the policy of the Government, even now, were directed to a rapprochement with Russia.
******************************** Lords Sitting of 24 August 1939 ********************************
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (VISCOUNT HALIFAX) ... That, in outline, was the situation when on August 22, the day before yesterday, it was officially stated in Berlin and Moscow that negotiations had been in progress, and were to be at once continued, for the signature of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany. I do not conceal the fact that this announcement came as a surprise to His Majesty`s Government. For some time past there had been rumours of a change in the relations between the German and Soviet Governments, but no hint of such a change was conveyed by the Soviet Government to His Majesty`s Government or the French Government, with whom they were in negotiation; and on July 31 last the Prime Minister remarked in another place that His Majesty`s Government were showing a great degree of trust, and a strong desire to bring their negotiations with the Soviet Government to a successful issue, when, before any agreement had been finally reached on political matters, they agreed to send a Military Mission to Moscow to discuss military plans. The Military Missions of France and this country reached Moscow on August 1, and the conversations were proceeding to all appearance on a basis of mutual confidence, and it is, I do not conceal from your Lordships, certainly disturbing to learn that while these conversations were taking place the Soviet Government were secretly negotiating a pact with Germany for purposes which, on the face of it, were inconsistent with the objects, as we had understood them, of their foreign policy. I would not now pass any final judgment on this matter. That would be premature until we have had time to consult with the French Government as to the meaning and the consequences of the agreement, the actual text of which has been published this morning, but one matter forces itself upon the immediate attention of His Majesty`s Government. They had to consider what effect this changed situation should have on their policy. In Berlin the agreement was somewhat cynically welcomed as a great diplomatic victory which removed the danger of war, since, so it was alleged, Great Britain and France would no longer fulfil their obligations to Poland, and His Majesty`s Government felt it their first duty to remove this dangerous illusion. It should be recalled, if it is not in mind, that our guarantee to Poland was given before any agreement with Russia was in prospect, and without condition that such agreement should be reached. His Majesty`s Government therefore at once issued a statement that their obligations to Poland and other countries remained unaffected; and throughout these days, as noble Lords will imagine, we have been in close and constant contact with the French Government, whose attitude is identical with our own. Our obligations rest on the agreed statements which were made in this House and in another place, and which are binding. Effect is being given to them in treaties, which are in an advanced stage of negotiation, and these treaties will formally define the mutual obligations of the parties, but they neither add to nor subtract from the obligations of mutual assistance which have been already accepted. ...
21:53 30.10.2013
slushauvas писал(а) в ответ на :
> Некоторые абзацы из выступлений в британском парламенте.
Жаль, что не всем посилам перевести этот текст самостоятельно ... Еще более жаль. что я тоже не могу это сделать
00:22 31.10.2013
Не сожалей - не стоит оно того...
01:47 31.10.2013
souser писал(а) в ответ на :
> Не сожалей - не стоит оно того...
Это Вы, пожалуй, зря. Парламентарии вопрошают: - почему такой состав делегации - почему переговоры длятся полгода - почему затык с формулировкой "косвенной агрессии" - и другие интересные нюансы
Также меня зацепило упоминание о существовавших до 25 августа 1939 года соглашениях между ВБ и Польшей. Чего там не хватало, если срочно понадобился ещё один договор?
10:42 31.10.2013
slushauvas писал(а) в ответ на :
> Это Вы, пожалуй, зря.
Вообще-то считается неприличным помещать текст на иностранном языке без перевода в любом форуме или сообществе, не созданном для изучения иностранных языков.
